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TE A C HI N G NOT E S  
 






The purpose of this case is to provide a framework to understand the complex operational 
environment facing a U.S. advisor team, and to equip the student to ask the right questions that 
will help him or her to be prepared.  
  
This case study will take students through the leadership challenges faced by an advisor team 
in Iraq. The discussions are intended to provide an understanding of local politics, including an 
appreciation for the expectations and needs of the people; to identify signs of corruption among 
host-nation partners; and to assess how military assets and resources can be used to improve the 
chances of operational success. 
 
Target Audience: 
 •  military advisors; 
 •  members of a coalition military force; 
 •  international or military law students; and 
 •  cultural anthropologists assigned to Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). 
 
Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes to Be Developed 
 
Knowledge 
 • multicultural dimensions to complex problems in a conflict zone; 
 • subtext of how Iraqi security forces intend to exercise authority and to change their 
commanders; 
 • indicators of a baited ambush; 
 • impact of Sharia law on society; and 
 • mosques as sites protected by international law, though that status can be tested. 
 
Skills 
 •  use of influence with host-nation counterpart; 
 •  tactical decision-making; 
 •  force protection in a time-constrained environment; 
 •  preparation for possible counterattacks from the civilian population; and 
 •  understanding Iraqi military culture. 
 
Attitudes 
 •  use host-nation forces (rather than U.S. forces) to clear a dangerous area; 
 •  enhance the legitimacy of host-nation security forces; 
                                                     
∗
 Joshua Potter  is a Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) serving as a Battalion Commander of the 81
st
 
Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas.  This case is based on the experience of the author, 
who served as SHADOW 6 commander during the raid. 
 
 
 •  achieve credibility in the eyes of the indigenous people; and 
 •  Build respect for protected sites. 
 
ANALYSIS AND PROCESS 
 
Challenge the target audience to adopt different roles in order to understand different 
perspectives and critical issues.  
 
Perspectives to Consider 
• The Iraqi patrol leader 
• The Iraqi commander; 
• The U.S. commander;  
• An embedded media reporter who arrives on location to interview the members of the 
Iraqi Security Forces and U.S. forces working together 
• The U.S. transition team chief (SHADOW 6); and 
• The people of Abu Descheer, observing the unfolding operation. 
 
Questions to Ask 
 
Role of an Advisor 
What is the relationship between the U.S. and Iraqi security forces? 
How do we support and develop the host-nation security forces? 
Perception of Legitimacy 
Who holds the power in this scenario? 
Are you willing to abdicate power for self-preservation? 
Impact of Attacks against Civilians 
Who wins when the bodies are left in the street? 
Military Use of a Recognized Protected Site 




Before class, distribute Handout 1. This handout provides situational reports faced by the 
SHADOW team leader. 
 
Handouts 2 and 3 can be distributed at the end of the case discussion and can lead the case 
debrief. 
 An epilogue and report by the actual SHADOW 6 leader could serve as useful reference 




Give the case to the class, and allow five minutes to read the material. 
At the conclusion, show the video clip of the SHADOW team leader who faced this situation. 
 





What is the situation? 
 
What should SHADOW 6 do? 
 
Change the Perspective 
Place students in the role of the different actors identified above. What is the actor’s 
perspective? Is the actor’s perspective influenced by other actors? How would the other actors 
react to any action of SHADOW 6? 
 
Follow up Questions 
 
What rules of engagement should be applied? 
Who holds the power in this scenario? 






Ask, “What is the ‘right’ answer?” 
Distribute Handouts 2 and 3. Allow the class time to read the material, either for immediate 
class discussion or for use in the case debriefing session. 
 
Debriefing 
Conduct a debriefing to capture lessons learned—a board plan is provided below. These lessons 
may prove helpful in future training iterations. 
 
Conclude the debriefing by answering the question, How did this case study change or shape 
my perceptions or actions? 
 
BOARD PLAN 
BOARD 1: SHADOW 6 response and driving factors 
BOARD 2: Implications of rules of engagement and who holds the power 
BOARD 3: Use of information operations 
BOARD 4: Additional considerations for further discussion, if time permits 




The following provides responses to frequently raised points by the students when the author ran 
the case. These responses may prove interesting in conducting the discussion. 
 
Request additional U.S. military support. 
    
It is not available. The U.S. commander in the area did not want to add to the quick reaction 
force, other than the four Bradley fighting vehicles. The U.S. commander did not want to 
 
 
force a decisive engagement in a mosque involving U.S. forces, and four heavily armored 
Bradley fighting vehicles were deemed sufficient to rescue the U.S. MiTT if the situation 
required an immediate extraction. 
 
Request additional Iraqi military support. 
   It is not available. The Iraqi battalion commander was called by SHADOW 6 to explain 
why his meager patrol force seemed ill-prepared for a serious raid that would likely end up 
with heavy casualties without a sufficient show of force or back up force in the area. The Iraqi 
battalion commander (from the Third Battalion, Fourth Public Order Brigade) ultimately cried 
and said that he was sorry: “I am not permitted to send the right people to do this job.” 
SHADOW 6 believed the public order brigade commander prevented sending a better Iraqi 
force, with the full understanding that the raid mission would be handicapped from the start. 
 
Request U.S. aircraft to support the operation. 
 
   Not available. The MiTT is not equipped with unmanned aerial vehicles, which are often 
used in surveillance for this type of raid or urban assault missions. The U.S. attack helicopters 
were not on station during this time frame—though they did appear around 1:00 a.m., when the 
Iraqi special operations forces element attempted to conduct a raid on the same mosque. They 
revealed several built-up bunkers in and around the mosque, which were considered well-
prepared defensive positions.  
 
Was the public order brigade openly affiliated with Jayish al-Mahdi? 
    
Yes. Less than six weeks prior to this incident, the MiTT leadership had proved direct ties 
between this public order battalion and Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia, Jayish al-Mahdi. The 
public order brigade commander was replaced with Colonel Muhammed (from the case 
study). This was a source of friction between the MiTT and the public order brigade 
leadership; however, the MiTT and Colonel Muhammed had an excellent working 
relationship. On the day following the Golden Shrine bombing, Jayish al-Mahdi agents 
attacked and beat Colonel Muhammed’s eighteen-year-old son. This was a direct act of 




                                                     
1
From Chapter 3, Counterinsurgency Operations, Section IV Information Operations: “The Army 
defines information operations as the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, 
computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations 
security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend 
information and information systems, and to influence decision making (FM 3-13). The goal of 
IO is to gain and maintain information superiority at decisive points.” See 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-07-22/ch3-iv.htm  (accessed 
April 14, 2010). 
 
